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This thesis explores how E-3 Air Battle Managers train for and perform 
their duties on board the Airborne Warning and Control System.  The study 
focuses on how E-3 training is driven by the maintenance of a set of battle 
management core competencies rooted in the basics of aircraft tactical fluid 
control, force accountability and aerial refueling.  The advent of a revolution in 
Information Management technology in the form of the 40/45 weapons system 
upgrade for the E-3 will drive the Air Force to rethink how training is 
accomplished with new capabilities and emerging missions in the battlespace.  
The current approach to block will not allow the Air Force to exploit the  
capabilities of the 40/45 airframe.  Lessons from emerging areas such as 
knowledge management and sensemaking need to be assimilated into the way 
the Air Force trains E-3 Air Battle Managers to ensure future combat capability of 
aircrews in the increasingly technical and complex battlespace of future military 
operations.  Existing core competencies need to be considered individual skill 
sets, and knowledge management and sensemaking introduced to better prepare 
battle managers to effectively and efficiently interpret inputs in the battlespace 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF E-3 OPERATIONS 1979-2005 ....................... 1 
B. AIR BATTLE MANAGER TRAINING SYNOPSIS 1979-2005 ............. 3 
C. BLOCK 40/45 UPGRADE FOR THE E-3............................................. 4 
D. DOMINANT BATTLESPACE KNOWLEDGE AND 
SENSEMAKING................................................................................... 5 
E. THE FOCUS AND METHODOLOGY OF THIS PAPER ...................... 7 
II. E-3 TRAINING: HOW THEY DO IT NOW....................................................... 9 
A. THE CURRENT TRAINING PLAN FOR E-3 AIR BATTLE 
MANAGERS ........................................................................................ 9 
B. CURRENCY VERSUS PROFICIENCY.............................................. 11 
1. Currency................................................................................. 11 
2. Proficiency ............................................................................. 12 
3. Making up for Missed Time—The Spin up for OIF .............. 16 
4. Bringing the Lessons Forward—Spin up for OIF................ 18 
III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM OEF AND OIF ............................................... 21 
A. REFOCUSING EFFORTS AFTER OEF AND ANACONDA .............. 21 
B. LESSONS RELEARNED IN OIF........................................................ 23 
IV. BLOCK 40/45: THE NEW INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
TECHNOLOGY............................................................................................. 27 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF BLOCK 40/45 .................................................... 27 
B. NEW APPLICATIONS AVAILABLE TO THE ABM........................... 28 
V. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, SENSEMAKING AND KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT: TRAINING FOR THE FUTURE ........................................ 31 
A. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS—THE KEY TO EFFECTIVE 
EMPLOYMENT .................................................................................. 31 
1. Level 1 SA—Perception ........................................................ 32 
2. Level 2 SA—Comprehension................................................ 33 
3. Level 3 SA—Projection of Future Status ............................. 34 
4. Mental Models, Schema and Scripts.................................... 35 
a. Mental Models ............................................................. 35 
b. Schemata ..................................................................... 37 
c. Scripts.......................................................................... 37 
B. SENSEMAKING—MAKING SENSE OF THE SITUATION ............... 38 
VI. REVAMPING TRAINING—THE ART OF EXECUTION ............................... 41 
A. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER:  THE INTEGRATED 
TRAINING MODEL ............................................................................ 41 
1. The Integrated Training Model.............................................. 42 
2. AWACS Mission Essential Competencies:  The Heart of 
the Matter................................................................................ 43 
 viii
B. CHOOSING THE RIGHT TIME TO CHANGE AND EXECUTING 
THE PLAN ......................................................................................... 44 
1. When is the Right Time?....................................................... 44 
2. Implementing the New Idea—the Art of Execution ............. 46 
VII. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 51 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 55 












Figure 1. What’s in block 40/45 ......................................................................... 29 
Figure 2. Boyd’s OODA Loop ............................................................................ 31 
Figure 3. Schema, mental models and situation awareness, adapted from 
Endsley, M., Bolte. B. &Jones, D. (2003). Designing for Situation 
Awareness: An approach to user-centered design. New York: 
Taylor and Francis.............................................................................. 36 
Figure 4. The Integrated Training Model ........................................................... 42 
Figure 5. Expectations versus reality with the introduction of a new idea and 






























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi




Table 1. Rated aircrew production 1989-2004.................................................... 3 
Table 2. E-3 Mission Crew Currency Requirements......................................... 11 
Table 3. SD 20 Month ATD Training Requirements, August 2005. .................. 13 
Table 4. Weapons (SD/AWO/WD) 20 Month DMT Requirements, Adapted 
from AFI 11-2E-3 Volume 1, August 2005.......................................... 14 
Table 5. SD, ECO 20 Month Flying Requirements, August 2005. ADAPTED .. 15 
Table 6. AWO/WD 20 Month Flying Requirements, August 2005. ................... 15 
Table 7. AWO/WD 20 Month ATD Training Requirements............................... 16 



























This thesis is dedicated to battle management professionals who have 
persevered through challenging times in all the corners of the globe.  Combatant 
Commanders don’t go to war without you, and even in these challenging times of 
budget constraints and limited resources, the community still continues to 
perform at an impressive level.  The E-3 continues to prove its value as an 
essential asset, and it will continue to be so in the future of combat employment.  
We, as a community, will continue to perform no matter what the odds and 
overcome all the obstacles in our way to the best command and control in the 
world.   
I also would like to thank Dr. Erik Jansen and Dr. Bob O’Connell for 
allowing me to explore this topic.  Without their steadfast guidance and trust, this 
















































                                           
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF E-3 OPERATIONS 1979-2005 
The E-3 community has been deployed in support of operations worldwide 
since the original delivery of the weapons system to the Air Force in 1979.  From 
the Yemen conflict that same year to the most recent conflict in Iraq; aircrews 
have supported a myriad of air battle management missions ranging from 
surveillance to tactical fluid control, and finally dynamic targeting operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Over the years since Yemen and throughout these 
conflicts, technology improvements in weapons systems and tactics for 
employment have changed significantly.  Air battle management operations 
during the 1980’s were primarily surveillance, identification and data link 
management, primarily in the Middle East surrounding the ELF ONE operation 
where crews were tasked with monitoring the ongoing Iran-Iraq war.  Although   
E-3 crews were deployed to other areas of the world in support of North 
American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) operations and special surveillance 
mission in the Pacific Theater covering the downing of KAL flight 200, the primary 
mission of E-3 crews went primarily unchanged. 
E-3 crews redeployed back to the United States, ending an eleven year 
continuous deployment in support of ELF ONE in 1990.  Soon after the crews 
returned home, the call for the buildup back in Saudi Arabia came in for support 
of Operation DESERT SHIELD following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  E-3 crews 
were called on for their same basic functions; combat identification of air traffic, 
surveillance of the airspace surrounding the Arabian Peninsula, and information 
flow to the command authority which was primarily in the form of data link 
communications.  Although there were 39 of 41 air to air kills credited with air 
battle management assistance, the basic core competencies of E-3 aircrews 
were tested, and the results supported the training that E-3 crews had been 
doing.1   
 
1 552 Air Control Wing Lessons Learned (1992). Operation Desert Storm Lessons Learned. 
Verified by telephone interview with Major Justin Hickman, 552 OSS/OSK DSN: 884-4466 
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In 1993, the air battle management community took a big hit during the 
Department of Defense wide Reduction in Forces as our military drawdown 
began.  One hundred eighty-nine air battle management professionals were 
relieved from duty that year, dealing a significant blow to the career field’s 
experience base just having returned from war in the Gulf.2  The effect of this 
experience drain coupled with a two year draw down and eventual zero 
accession in 1995 of officers into the career field further exacerbated the lack of 
experience in the air battle management community.3  There were only 209 Air 
Battle Manager (ABM) accessions between 1993 and 1996, which works out to a 
net gain of only 20 battle managers over the four year period.  This timeframe is 
referred to as the ABM “bathtub” where lack of aircrew manning prevailed at 
Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma from the late 1990’s until early 2001.  The 
results of these cuts and redesignations were corrected in 1996 and are not 
projected to be normalized until 2009.4  The prolonged presence of aircrews in 
the Middle East supporting the Northern and Southern no fly zones over Iraq, 
coupled with less than challenging missions as far as battle management core 
competencies are concerned, such as counter-drug missions in the southern 
hemisphere, eroded E-3 crews battle management competencies.   
 
 
2 Telephone interview with Major George Wilson, Headquarters Air Force Personnel Center, 
Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.  Interview conducted 15 July 2005. 
3 Cathey, M. (2005) ABM Career Field Update.  PowerPoint presentations delivered at the 
USAF Combat Air Forces Weapons and Tactics Conference. 
4 Ibid. 
 
Table 1.   Rated aircrew production 1989-2004 
 
 
B. AIR BATTLE MANAGER TRAINING SYNOPSIS 1979-2005 
Undergraduate controller training at Tyndall AFB, FL underwent major 
changes during the mid-1990s to better prepare ABMs for their unique 
requirement to become proficient in a number of core competencies.  The E-3 
community has tremendous challenges to deal with concerning training and 
maintaining combat readiness for the spectrum of operations they are tasked to 
support.  The E-3 community does the best it can with current training guidance 
to maintain combat mission readiness with concentrating on core competencies 
of assigned missions.  These core competencies include directing aircraft in 
offensive and defensive tactical missions, coordinating aircraft control and 
warning activities, force accountability of assigned assets, and aerial refueling.5  
As an ABM progresses, responsibilities and core competencies may broaden 
and become more complex to include:  knowledge of electronic attack and 
protect fundamentals, interaction with other C2 agencies, and familiarization with 
air defense organizations, air defense capabilities, and operating procedures 
between air and naval forces.6   
                                            
5 Air Battle Manager Career Path Guide.  Extracted from http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/ofcr-




                                           
These battle management core competencies are based largely on 
mission, doctrine and lessons learned.  The result is that many of the training 
requirements for E-3 aircrews are based upon reward looking requirements.  
Although a logical place to start, this leads the E-3 community many times to 
train for the “last mission” instead of looking forward to base training on expected 
future operations.  Although a challenge, and recognizing that no one can 
accurately predict the future, the advent of new weaponry and Information 
Management technology warrants a retooling of the way we do business as 
ABMs.     
Core competencies such as aerial refueling and force accountability are 
not trained to adequately; these are two of the most important, challenging and 
least successful missions performed by E-3 aircrews in large force operations.  
Battle management skills such as the unique challenges of Dynamic Targeting 
and support for ground forces have emerged from Operations ENDURING 
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM as the newest requirements for Combatant 
Commanders, but E-3 training does not adequately prepare crews for these 
missions and requirements.7   
E-3 crews leading up to OEF and OIF were forced to bridge the gap 
between current core competencies and mission requirements for those conflicts.  
The result in both instances was a “just in time” conflict spin up methodology 
where short notice academics and simulation scenarios were developed on the 
fly and incorporated just prior to crews deploying.  Although relatively effective, 
the E-3 community must develop a new training philosophy supported by existing 
and future training simulations to better prepare crews for future operations.   
C. BLOCK 40/45 UPGRADE FOR THE E-3 
The USAF has chosen to prolong the AWACS program as a cornerstone 
of the JFACC’s ability to execute the ATO in support of a myriad of graduated 
combat operations.  Block 40/45 will bring a huge leap forward in technological 
capability concerning air battle management.  The baseline increase in capability 
will come from a revolutionary change in computing capability transitioning from 
 
7 Air Battle Manager Career Path Guide.  Extracted from http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/ofcr-
cpguide/New_Folder/Ch2-21.htm 2 December, 2004 
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1960s legacy architecture to an open systems architecture utilizing and 
ETHERNET LAN.8  Along with the computer upgrade, Man-machine interface will 
be much better than in the previous 30/35 configuration introducing “rollover 
information” options, operator selected tabular displays of information and tactical 
bearing and range as well as topography and ATO data available at the 
operator’s fingertips.9   
40/45 production is scheduled for Fiscal years 2008-2015, with initial 
delivery to Tinker AFB in October of 2009.10  Initial operational capability (IOC) 
will be declared with five aircraft delivered and is estimated to be in fiscal year 
2010.11  It is clear that the Air Force is committed to upgrading the primary 
weapons system dedicated to tactical command and control, and it has invested 
significant resources to that end.  The potential pitfall, however, lies in falling 
back into the old core competencies of the block 30/35 aircraft.  The true combat 
capability of the new weapons system on board the E-3 will not be realized 
without significant and far reaching changes to the philosophy of training 
employed from Initial Qualification Training all the way to Continuation Training of 
E-3 aircrews.  The new philosophy of training needs to be centered on 
knowledge management and sensemaking, transitioning current core 
competencies to necessary skill sets.  By rethinking current core competencies in 
this way, they will not drive E-3 aircrew training, but will be necessary skills 
required to execute new concepts of core competencies centered on effective 
decision making, information flow and assurance, and dynamic battle 
management in extremely congested and fast paced environments.     
D. DOMINANT BATTLESPACE KNOWLEDGE AND SENSEMAKING 
In 1995, VADM William Owens argued that the advances in technology 
and weapons systems was increasing the U.S. military’s capacity to process and 
 





                                           
make sense of incredibly large volumes of data.12   Dominant Battlespace 
Knowledge (DBK) encompasses a wide range of information from target 
recognition and identification to knowledge of our opponent’s operational scheme 
of maneuver.13  If we can significantly increase DBK ahead of our opponent, we 
can increase the gap that exists between our capability to wage operations within 
a specific battlespace more quickly, efficiently and lethally than our adversaries.  
Our ability to transfer DBK among players committed to a specific campaign will 
increase our capability to apply force with speed, accuracy and persistence 
required to be successful.  DBK will aid in ensuring correct force allocation for a 
specific mission.14
DBK at the tactical level as it applies to E-3 ABM crews is not practiced 
nor trained to under the current E-3 training plan detailed in Air Force Instruction 
11-2E3 volume 1.15  Operations no longer take place on the linear battlefield, and 
they encompass a much wider spectrum of operations to include asymmetric 
threats and dynamic targeting scenarios.  Today’s battlespace is populated by 
multiple coalition military and non-governmental organizations on the ground and 
in the air, often prosecuting non-Air Tasking Order assigned missions on very 
short timelines.  Also, E-3 crews are being asked to execute new employment 
concepts not trained adequately to before, such as Close Air Support, Dynamic 
Targeting and multiple anchor and aircraft aerial refueling.  Existing core 
competencies do not effectively prepare ABMs to perform these missions to the 
level required in major theater warfare.  Further, as the U.S. military adopts 
network centric operations as the standard, a fundamental shift from “platform-
centric” warfare will go by the wayside as DBK emerges as the requirement for 
success.16   
 




15 US Air Force Instruction 11-2E3 Volume 1. (2005) E-3 Aircrew Training. Retrieved 9 
August 2005 from http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/afi11-2e-3v1/afi11-2e-3v1.pdf 
16 Labicki, M. & Johnson, S. (1995) 
7 
                                           
Sensemaking as it applies to E-3 ABMs addresses issues such as placing 
information into frameworks or a schema, comprehending what is happening 
around the individual, constructing the meaning of a situation and interacting in 
pursuit of shared mutual understanding.17  This is the crux of the ABM’s job as it 
applies to tactical command and control, battle management and information flow 
in the battlespace among integrated forces.  Core competencies such as Tactical 
Fluid Control of aircraft, Aerial Refueling mechanics and Communications 
discipline are not core competencies, but skill sets required to accomplish the 
greater goal of sensemaking and DBK.   
E. THE FOCUS AND METHODOLOGY OF THIS PAPER 
This paper will not have all the answers, nor is it designed to replace the 
current E-3 training plan for ABMs.  The purpose of this paper is to explore how 
E-3 crews train today and identify more effective ways to prepare aircrews for 
future military operations.  The way to do that lies in utilizing a more 
comprehensive approach to training, realizing that technology available to E-3 
crews will undergo a major renovation in the next 5 years.  I introduce in more 
detail the art of sensemaking and DBK and how marrying this new training 
philosophy with IT positional training on the new weapons system will be 
essential to fully realize the combat capability of 40/45.  The USAF should not 
miss this opportunity to rethink how we do business during an already 
monumental upgrade in capability, because another opportunity of this 
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II. E-3 TRAINING: HOW THEY DO IT NOW 
 
 
A. THE CURRENT TRAINING PLAN FOR E-3 AIR BATTLE MANAGERS 
The governing document for E-3 aircrew members conducting Initial 
Qualification, Mission Qualification and Continuation Training is Air Force 
Instruction 11-2E3 Volume 1.  This instruction is designed to ensure ABMs have 
all required prerequisites and minimum training requirements necessary to 
prepare aircrew members to perform basic aircrew duties in the E-3 aircraft.18  
Upon graduation from Undergraduate Controller Training at Tyndall Air Force 
Base, an ABM is expected to have the basic skill sets required to perform basic 
battle management functions, some exposure to mission scenarios, and basic 
training in datalink and communications as well as electronic attack and protect 
procedures.19  When ABMs are assigned to Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma 
and enter training, the focus in Initial Qualification Training is on positional 
proficiency in a crewmembers specific job area.  Although training scenarios test 
and build on previously acquired skills, ABM scenarios are at a basic level, 
emphasizing proficiency and efficiency in specific skill sets such as 
communications discipline, computer interface, and standards of weapons 
control and battle management. 
Upon completion of Initial Qualification Training (IQT), E-3 aircrews are 
sent to Mission Qualification Training (MQT), which is designed to qualify 
personnel to perform aircrew duties during E-3 operational and training missions.  
MQT builds on acquired skill sets, with emphasis on crew integration and mission 
scenarios.20  Aircrews learn more about the various missions of the E-3 and 
practice integrating into an effective and efficient combat team on board the E-3.  
Mission Qualification Training introduces missions such as Dynamic Targeting, 
Close Air Support and advanced datalink operations, however, the focus on 
 
18 United States Air Force Headquarters Air Education and Training Command. (2004) 
Undergraduate Air Battlem Manager Training Syllabus (Validation). Randolph Air Force Base, TX. 
19 Ibid. 
20 US Air Force Instruction 11-2E3 Volume 1. (2005) E-3 Aircrew Training. Retrieved 9 
August 2005 from http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/afi11-2e-3v1/afi11-2e-3v1.pdf 
10 
                                           
these scenarios is at an exposure level only.  Crews can not be expected to be 
proficient at these missions upon completion of mission qualifying training.  
Continuation Training is designed to maintain E-3 qualification and currency, 
maintain the ABMs basic skill sets, and increase proficiency at more complex 
mission scenarios.21  Air Force Instruction11-2E-3 volume 1 defines currency as 
“flying and Aircrew Training Device (ATD) training designed to maintain 
proficiency and improve crewmember capabilities”.22  Along with localized 
simulator training and flight training, the USAF has many venues in which 
aircrews on the E-3 practice combat mission employment.  Live fly exercises 
include RED FLAG at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and MAPLE FLAG at Cold 
Lake, Ontario, Canada and Joint Expeditionary Force Exercise with major flying 
operations at Nellis.  
The biggest challenge to developing the necessary skills to perform more 
complex missions such as Dynamic Targeting and Close Air Support is that 
these scenarios are not properly prioritized in continuation training for E-3 ABMs.  
Much of E-3 training is driven by other asset availability as the E-3 aircrews are 
essentially “end users” when it comes to battle management and aircraft control.  
Current simulation systems available at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, 
Kadena Air Base, Japan, and Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska do not provide 
adequate training scenarios for these complex missions.  This is due largely to 
the fact that legacy AWACS mission simulators lack the technology and simulator 
operator personnel capability to adequately reproduce scenarios of enough 
complexity to effectively train.  Distributive mission trainers23 are also available, 
however, due to the number of DMT sites available to the Air Force; training 
scenarios with enough complexity to emulate real missions are not yet possible.  
 
21 US Air Force Instruction 11-2E3 Volume 1. (2005) E-3 Aircrew Training. Retrieved 9 
August 2005 from http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/afi11-2e-3v1/afi11-2e-3v1.pdf 
22 Ibid. 
23 Distributive Mission Trainers are the backbone of virtual combat in the Distributed Mission 
Operations which emerged in 1998 as an avenue to provide aerial war fighters with cyberspace 
training from remote locations while interacting with each other real time in a synthetic 
battlespace.  The USAFs training requirements are relying more on DMO as the fidelity of the 
overall system increases. 
As the number of DMTs increase, this capability will continue to improve.  
Mission Simulator Live Intercept Training Environment (MSLITE) is a system that 
allows AWACS Air Battle Managers to control live fighters from Tinker Air Force 
Base using Air Defense Sector’s remote RADAR, Identification friend or foe, and 
communications feeds from coastal sensor sites.24
B. CURRENCY VERSUS PROFICIENCY 
1. Currency 
Air Force Instruction 11-2E3 volume 1 specifies flying requirements for 
maintaining currency in the aircraft.  Currency, although not defined in the 
instruction, is “the state of being current; up to datedness”25 The use of the word 
currency as it pertains to the training volume indicates the period in which an 
individual must fly to maintain the legal capability to perform duties as an aircrew 
member without instructor or evaluator supervision.  Currency requirements for 
E-3 ABMs are listed below in table 2: 
 
Table 2.   E-3 Mission Crew Currency Requirements 
 
Table 2 details how often specific crew positions need to fly to maintain 
this currency—that is the ability to fly without an instructor or evaluator present.  
An event operation for a Senior Director (the leader of the weapons section) is 
where the SD conducts mission planning for and then supervises Air Weapons 
Officers or enlisted Weapons Directors while controlling live aircraft.26  A 
controlled mission required to maintain currency for an AWO / WD occurs when 
                                            
24 US Air Force Instruction 11-2E3 Volume 1. (2005) E-3 Aircrew Training. Retrieved 9 
August 2005 from http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/afi11-2e-3v1/afi11-2e-3v1.pdf 
25 Online Dictionary (n.d.) Retrieved 18 August 2005 from: 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=currency 
26 US Air Force Instruction 11-2E3 Volume 1. (2005) E-3 Aircrew Training. Retrieved 9 
August 2005 from http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/afi11-2e-3v1/afi11-2e-3v1.pdf 
11 
12 
                                           
at least one mission is controlled by an AWO / WD from check-in of the aircraft 
with the controller to handoff of the aircraft back to another agency.27 This 
currency requirement can be fulfilled from a myriad of control missions to include 
Composite Force Training, Aerial Refueling, Time Sensitive Targeting, Close Air 
Support, Combat Search and Rescue, and Check-in / Force Accountability.28   
2. Proficiency 
Proficiency is defined as “the quality of having great facility and 
competence; skillfulness in the command of fundamentals deriving from practice 
and familiarities”.29 The maintenance of proficiencies in certain tasks on board 
the E-3 also are governed by 11-2E-3 volume 1.  Training requirements for 
proficiency are listed in three categories: (1) Ground training requirements; (2) 
Aircrew training device requirements; and (3) Flying training requirements.  
Ground training comprises events that contribute to safety in the operation of 
duties in the airborne environment.  Ground training requirements also include 
skills such as the wear of protective chemical equipment, physiological training 
and periodic intelligence training.30  Combat Mission Ready (CMR) status 
indicates a crewmember who is current on all three categories of training and 
does not require an instructor or evaluator to be present when performing duties 
as an Air Battle Manager.  CMR flying and ATD training requirements are 
reevaluated every 20 months to coincide with the Air Expeditionary Force rotation 
cycle.  The current RAP Tasking message covers the period from 1 September 
2004 to 31 May 2006.31  There is a provision written into the message that allows 
for mid-cycle updates to the message to allow units to tailor their training for 
 
 27 US Air Force Instruction 11-2E3 Volume 1. (2005) E-3 Aircrew Training. Retrieved 9 
August 2005 from http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/afi11-2e-3v1/afi11-2e-3v1.pdf  
28 Ibid. 
29 Online Dictionary (n.d.) Retrieved 18 August 2005 from: 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=proficiency 
30 US Air Force Instruction 11-2E3 Volume 1. (2005) E-3 Aircrew Training. Retrieved 9 
August 2005 from http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/afi11-2e-3v1/afi11-2e-3v1.pdf 
31 Headquarters Air Force Ready Aircrew Program Tasking Message. (2004). Headquarters 
Air Combat Command: Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. 
13 
specific requirements and to allow for new training requirements should E-3 
tasking be modified based upon new mission requirements.32   
The RAP tasking message states that the total sorties and events 
specified in it are minimums that ensure training to continually meet all tasked 
requirements for AWACS squadrons; they may only be reduced with the 
submission of a waiver request.33  The following tables detail Air Battle Manager 
20 month Aircrew Training Device (ATD), Distributed Mission Trainers (DMT) and 
live flight requirements for proficiency, current as of August 2005: 
TRAINING 
EVENT 
NOTES CMR/E CMR/I 
Mission Scenario 2 13 13 
Air to Air        1, 5, 
6 
3 7 
Air Refueling  1, 
6 
2 3 
Time Sensitive Targeting 1, 
3 
2 3 










1.  SDs may use excess live Controlled Missions to credit the applicable 
type of ATD mission on a 1 for 1 basis. 
2.  Mission scenarios can consist of AOR, NORAD, FLAG, etc and will be
conducted with a weapons team, a surveillance team, and when possible an ECO
3.  Will be conducted with an MCC and an ECO 
4.  Will be conducted with an MCC 
5.  At least 50% of air to air events must be at least 4 v X 
6.  Requires only weapons crew positions 
Table 3.   SD 20 Month ATD Training Requirements, August 2005. 
 
Table 3 details the requirements for both an experienced and 
inexperienced Senior Director—the lead Air Battle Manager of the weapons team 
                                            
32 Headquarters Air Force Ready Aircrew Program Tasking Message. (2004). Headquarters 
Air Combat Command: Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. 
33 Headquarters Air Force Ready Aircrew Program Tasking Message. (2004). Headquarters 
Air Combat Command: Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. 
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on board the E-3.  As table 3 shows, to maintain CMR status, an SD must 
perform at least 13 mission training scenarios and two or three each of the 
specified missions based on experience.  These mission scenarios help to 
simulate battle management and command and control operations and maintain 
proficiency in the essential skills required of an E-3 crewmember. 
 
 
TRAINING EVENT NOTES CMR/E CMR/I 
DMT Mission 1, 2 5 10 
E=Experienced/I=Inexperienced 
NOTES:   
1.  DMT Events include any 2 v X, 4 v X, or CFT mission briefed, executed, and 
debriefed in the DMT environment.  
3.  For units where DMT is not available, live Event Operations (SD) and Controlled 
Missions (AWO/WD) may be substituted for DMT Missions on a 1 to 1 basis. 
Table 4.   Weapons (SD/AWO/WD) 20 Month DMT Requirements, Adapted 
from AFI 11-2E-3 Volume 1, August 2005 
 
Table 4 lists Distributive Mission Training events required within the same 
cycle for all ABMs on the jet; both SDs and AWOs.  DMT provides a more 
realistic simulation environment linking AWACS DMT simulators together with F-
15 and F-16 simulators with live pilots at other bases.34  Note three in figure 4 
details that live missions may be substituted for DMT missions on a one for one 
basis in the event that DMT missions are not available.  The DMT requirement 
introduces ten more events for an inexperienced ABM; however, the available 
missions are usually smaller and less complex than ATD missions and 






                                            
34 Brower, M. (n.d.) Distributed Mission Training. Retrieved 17 August 2005 from: 
http://www.military-training-technology.com/print_article.cfm?DocID=272  
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TRAINING EVENT NOTES CMR/E CMR/I 
Event Operation  20 40 
Controlled Mission All 6 6 
E=Experienced/I=Inexperienced. 
NOTES: 
1.  CMR SDs will control any live mission at least once a quarter and meet 20 month live 
controlling requirements.  Controlling consists of OCA/DCA, SEAD, CSAR, A/R, 2 v X,  
or 4 v X mission 
3.  Individuals may log up to 25% of their 20 month flying SD control requirements by 
controlling events on ground based radar equipment (MSLITE, TDF, Air Defense Sector, 
or other ground based radar). 
 
Table 5.   SD, ECO 20 Month Flying Requirements, August 2005. ADAPTED 
 
Table 5 details Senior Director flying training requirements for the 20 
month training cycle encompassed by the RAP tasking message.  For an 
inexperienced SD, usual flight planning at the squadron level would have 
inexperienced SDs flying at least 2 times per month and experienced SDs flying 
at least once a month.  The total training requirement for an SD combines all live 
flying, DMT and ATD requirements and totals 63 events for an inexperienced SD, 
and 38 events for an experienced SD.  These numbers work out to roughly three 
events per month for inexperienced and almost two per month for experienced 
senior directors. 
 
TRAINING EVENT NOTES CMR/E CMR/I 
Controlled Mission 1,2 26 52 
E=Experienced/I=Inexperienced. 
NOTES: 
1.  Consists of any mission with control of the following types:  Air-to-Air Employment, 
CFT, PACAF LFE event, TST, CAS, CSAR, Air Refueling, Check-In, or Assist.  Assist 
control will only qualify when conducted at any Flag exercise, Weapons School 
Integration phase, or Weapons School Mission Employment phase.  Check-In control 
will only qualify if conducted at any Flag exercise  
2.  Individuals may log up to 25% of their 20 Month controlled mission requirements by 
controlling events on ground based radar equipment (MSLITE, TDF, Air Defense Sector, 
or other ground based radar). 
Table 6.   AWO/WD 20 Month Flying Requirements, August 2005. 
 
Table 6 details Air Weapons Officer flying requirements for the 20 month 
training cycle.  An inexperienced AWO is required to fly 52 times, whereas an 
experienced AWO requires 26 flights to maintain proficiency.  The total training 
requirement for AWOs combined which is comparable to the SD totals in table 5, 
is 94 training events for an inexperienced AWO and 55 events for an 
experienced AWO.  Over the span of a 20 month training cycle, based on 
experience level, and AWO will fly for proficiency 4.7 times per month and 2.75 
respectively.  The number of required events specified in the message support 
currency and proficiency as they are written in 11-2E3 volume 1; however, the 
actual training events that comprise the majority of the training requirements are 
not of sufficient size and complexity to adequately prepare E-3 Air battle 
managers for the tasks they perform in current AWACS real world missions and 
future combat operations. 
Table 7.   AWO/WD 20 Month ATD Training Requirements 
 
3. Making up for Missed Time—The Spin up for OIF 
Prior to November 2004, 11-2E-3 volume contained static aircrew training 
requirements that underwent revision approximately every two years to ensure 
that training was consistent with USAF requirements concerning AWACS 
employment.  Shortly after the 11 September attacks in 2001, E-3 aircraft and 
crews were called on to participate in operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 
flying combat operations over Afghanistan in support of air strikes against 
TRAINING EVENT NOTES CMR/E CMR/I 
Mission Scenario 2 13 13 
Air to Air 1, 5, 6 3 7 
Air Refueling  1, 6 2 3 
Time Sensitive Targeting 1, 3 2 3 
Combat Search And Rescue 1, 3 2 3 
Close Air Support 1, 4 2 3 
E=Experienced/I=Inexperienced. 
NOTES: 
1.  SDs may use excess live Controlled Missions to credit the applicable type of ATD 
mission on a 1 for 1 basis. 
2.  Mission scenarios can consist of AOR, NORAD, FLAG, etc and will be conducted with
a weapons team, a surveillance team, and when possible an ECO 
3.  Will be conducted with an MCC and an ECO 
4.  Will be conducted with an MCC 
5.  At least 50% of air to air events must be at least 4 v X 
6.  Requires only weapons crew positions 
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terrorist and Taliban targets as well as supporting coalition teams on the ground.  
E-3 ABMs faced many challenges in supporting these missions.  The Operation 
ANACONDA after action report cited some of the challenges faced by all the 
aircrews in the battlespace as detailed by Major General Corley, USAF: 
The battle space was extremely constrained… B-52s at higher 
altitudes dropping JDAMs; B-1s at lower altitudes; unmanned 
vehicles such as Predator flying through there; P-3s, aircraft 
contributing to the ISR assets; helicopters down at the ground; fast-
moving aircraft, F-14s, F/A-18s, F-16s, F-15Es; tanker aircraft that 
are flying through there. So you begin to see and sense the degree 
of difficulty of deconfliction,35
There were further challenges faced by E-3 ABMs as well concerning 
orientation of the battlespace.  General Mosely commented that “in any given 
space – ground space – out there, you had regular and unconventional forces, 
humanitarian assistance guys, maybe regular guys and not one of us in the 
command authority knew where all of those guys were”.36  The battlespace was 
extremely complex in Afghanistan.  E-3 crews were exposed to situations and 
scenarios they not trained adequately for based on core competencies and 
training at the time.  General Mosely went on to say that: 
“you had to either have a JSOA [Joint Special Operations Area] 
stood up, or a killbox [engagement zone] stood up, or targets 
outside of that had to be blessed through an elaborate process” 
reaching “back to Tampa and in some cases back to 
Washington.”37
The control of the airspace and weapons releases was so tight that only 
pieces of the Afghanistan battlespace were “open” for strikes at any one time.38 
At times, the restrictions caused aircrew in the battlespace to miss opportunities 
to hit emerging targets. Over time, the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) 
grew accustomed to the new style of warfare and became adept at handling the 
 
35 Headquarters United States Air Force. (2005). Operation ANACONDA: An Airpower 
Perspective. Retrieved 21 April 2005 from:  





                                           
intricacies of the coordination process.39  These intricacies of a non-linear 
battlespace were difficult for E-3 ABMs to conceptualize, but the crews did get 
better over time as they gained experience in the Area of Responsibility (AOR).  
Looking back to the E-3 training plan, a question emerges: Why have these 
principles of command and control in a non-linear environment coupled with the 
advent of more dynamic battle management missions such as Time Sensitive 
Targeting (TST), not been written into E- 3 training? 
4. Bringing the Lessons Forward—Spin up for OIF 
As action slowed down after Operation ANACONDA, a new emerging 
operation loomed in the future of the United States and E-3 crews.  With almost 
16 months in between OEF and OIF, very little had been done to E-3 ABM 
training to account for TST and congested airspace control of aircraft.  TST and 
CAS requirements were not written into 11-2E-3 volume 1 until after OIF in 2004.  
Due to operational security of the impending operation in Iraq, very little 
advanced warning was given to the 552 Air Control Wing (ACW) at Tinker AFB, 
Oklahoma prior to the deployment order in January 2005.  The 552 ACW was 
tasked with controlling two thirds of the airspace along the Saudi / Iraq border, 
accounting for all strike, defensive counter air, offensive counter air, CAS and 
aerial refueling of assets supporting air operations for OIF.   
Due to the lack of training for TST and CAS, the 552 ACW underwent an 
abrupt and on the fly spin-up prior to deployment to adequately prepare crews for 
action in Iraq.40 During the preparation for OIF, leadership at the 552 ACW 
determined that the wing had not completed adequate training in the mission 
areas of TST and CAS to perform adequately during operations in Iraq.  To 
answer this shortfall, 552 ACW Wing tactics was empowered to assemble a team 
of experts from the USAF and Boeing to rapidly assemble two mission 
 
39 Headquarters United States Air Force. (2005). Operation ANACONDA: An Airpower 
Perspective. Retrieved 21 April 2005 from:  
http://www.af.mil/library/posture/Anaconda_Unclassified.pdf
40 The usual timeline for simulation scenario development with Boeing Aerospace 
contractors at Tinker AFB is approximately 6 months.  This timeline includes conceptualizing what 
the scenario is to entail, building the simulation on computer drives to run in the simulator, and 
completing a review process until the mission scenario is deemed to meet standards for crew 
training.   
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scenarios—a CAS scenario and TST scenario—to prepare all the mission crews 
deploying to participate in OIF.  The 552 ACW tactics office also was tasked with 
developing academics to present to the crews prior to executing the newly 
developed simulation scenarios.   
In the course of less than one week, in a Herculean effort, two simulation 
scenarios had been developed and refined, as well as  CAS and TST academic 
briefs both approved by the Operations Group and Wing Commanders.  The 552 
ACW now had adequate training to at least expose ABM crews to these two 
essential missions.  Each crew received academics on both missions and then 
worked through each simulation at least once; some crews had the opportunity to 
complete the exercise scenarios twice prior to deployment.   Along with the 
introduction of these new missions, seating and communications plans were 
developed to account for the flexibility needed in executing these missions within 
the weapons section on board the E-3 that would be required to successfully 
execute these dynamic and demanding missions.  
The experience that many of the crews gained in OEF exposed them to 
the concept of a non-linear battlespace and an extremely fluid environment 
where more than battle management core competencies were put to the test.  
The flow of information was the biggest challenge to the E-3 crews: how to 
process inputs from multiple sources, match it to their understanding of assigned 
tasking, and then ensure the information got to where it needed to go.  Coupled 
with extremely congested airspaces, with total sortie counts exceeding 1,500 
aircraft in a 24 hour period, which many controllers had not experienced before, it 
was difficult initially for many ABMs to maintain good situational awareness 
during the operation.41  Once controllers had  the experience of flying those 
operations, mental frameworks developed in which they could process the 
information coming into them and know where it need to be passed, whether to 
the mission commander, the CAOC, or internally to another controller on the E-3.   
 
41 Cordesman, A. (2003). The Iraq War: A Working Chronology. Washington: Center for 
Strategic and international studies.   
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To see how the crews really performed, the next chapter examines lessons 
learned from OEF and OIF to determine how prepared the crews really were to 




                                           
III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM OEF AND OIF 
A. REFOCUSING EFFORTS AFTER OEF AND ANACONDA 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM ushered in a version of aerial warfare 
unlike any the Air Force or joint operations had seen before.  Eighty percent of 
the time over Afghanistan, pilots received their targets after taking off for their 
missions. 42  The war in Afghanistan had a very different face than previous U.S. 
operations as well.  From October 2001 through January 2002, save for a 
handful of special operations teams on the ground, the fight in Afghanistan was 
mostly air and space power.43  Rebecca Grant stated that “the mechanics of 
airpower for OEF were different from those seen in other recent conflicts.  
Distance was a major challenge.  Navy fighters flew more than 700 miles one 
way from their carriers to their combat stations…bombers coming from the 
British-owned atoll of Diego Garcia faced a 2,500 mile one way trip”.44  The 
remoteness of the Area of Responsibility (AOR) wasn’t the only difference in this 
air war.  Vice Admiral John B. Nathman, then commander of all naval flying 
assets in the Pacific fleet stated that “After the first week, the pilots didn’t know 
what targets they’d be striking when they launched”.45
This environment created many challenges for ABMs on board the E-3 in 
Afghanistan.  The dynamics and fluidity of operations as it pertained to the 
increased occurrence of Time Sensitive Targets (now referred to as Dynamic 
Targets) required standard skills of CMR controllers to be used in new ways for 
which they had never previously trained.  Although the numbers of aircraft over 
Afghanistan at any given time were not many, the tight constraint of the airspace 
provided significant challenges to ABMs.  As emerging targets became the norm 
for combat aircrews, persistent availability of on call airpower was required.  This 
necessity evolved into B-1s and B-52s as the desired platforms in the AOR for 
 






support of TST.  The result for E-3 crews was more proactive management of 
aerial refueling to provide this persistent availability of firepower.  “Tanker 
consolidation” was a new concept introduced in the skies over Afghanistan.  Turn 
times of aircraft between missions and loiter times in the AOR were watched 
closely to ensure asset availability and to not impact the next day’s Air Tasking 
Order (ATO).   
The dynamic nature of air operations during OEF and ANACONDA saw 
multiple types of aircraft ranging from KC-135 tankers, RQ-1 Predators, AC-130 
Gunships, B-52 and B-1 bombers as well as a myriad of USAF and U.S. Navy 
(USN) fighter and strike aircraft.  E-3 ABMs were not used to controlling all of 
these types of aircraft during the same operation, and issues of airspace 
deconfliction, especially altitude deconfliction, target information passing, and 
ground troop deconfliction became prevalent in the operation.  Problems would 
arise when multiple assets in the AOR would go to prosecute targets within the 
same vicinity.  B-52s could provide persistent and lethal cover from above 40,000 
feet, but their weapons delivery profile might have them dropping ordnance 
through the altitude block of the AC-130, which might be operating significantly 
below them in the same geographic area.  Deconfliction, coupled with new 
concepts of employment of air to ground dynamic targeting and direct support of 
special operations and conventional army teams was something that many ABMs 
had not trained for and literally had to learn on the fly.   
These concepts of dynamic targeting and persistent asset management 
for refueling and maximum station time worked well during the OEF campaign.  
Many of the lessons learned from these operations were carried home to the 
units that executed those missions as “the future” of aerial combat operations.  
The E-3 community, primarily the 552 ACW, recognized the significance of what 
ABMs did during OEF, and, at least in concept, attempted to incorporate these 
new ideas into training.  There were no majors changes made to AFI 11-2E-3 
volume 1 at that time.  In the 16 months between OEF and OIF, the 552 ACW 
went back to business as usual adhering to RAP training requirements that were 
contained within 11-2E-3 volume 1. 
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B. LESSONS RELEARNED IN OIF 
The 363 Expeditionary Airborne Air Control Squadron (EAACS) amassed 
an impressive record in OIF from the start of combat operations 19 March 2003 
to the cessation of AWACS participation 28 May 2003.  The E-3 unit garnered a 
100% combat effectiveness rating, totaling 2,198.7 combat and combat support 
on station hours, controlling over 24, 000 aircraft sorties.46  During this period of 
AWACS operations, E-3 ABMs controlled over 700 strike packages and 13,000 
individual aerial refuelings which aided in the prosecution of over 150 TSTs.47  
The operation was dynamic almost from the start as described by Anthony 
Cordesman: 
The air campaign was adjusted in stride, as it was underway. Some 
planes hit they targets with which they were tasked upon departure, 
others had their targets shifted en route. Gen. Moseley, head of the 
air campaign, was described as "the quarterback of the operation, 
calling audibles in response to changing circumstances.48
Dynamic targeting was not new to E-3 crews—especially to ABMs having 
endured a week of intensive spin up applying lessons learned in OEF to future 
operations such as TST and CAS in Iraq.  Crews in OIF experienced more 
dynamic inputs, however this time, the strike packages were much bigger, and 
the airspace was even more congested than in OEF.  This was due in large part 
to the sheer size of the operation in Iraq as opposed to Afghanistan, as well as 
the fact that there were three E-3s on station simultaneously in Iraq, where there 
was only one in Afghanistan.  Multiple E-3 operations present unique challenges 
to crew employment in an already congested airspace...  Although the lessons 
concerning TST and CAS had been carried forward from OEF to OIF, the 
lessons learned report generated in October of 2003 detailed that the same 
issues concerning lack of training in certain mission areas still existed.   
 
46 Unclassified Accomplishments of the 363d Expeditionary Airborne Air Control Squadron: 
Operations Southern Watch and Iraqi Freedom. (2003). 552 Air Control Wing: Tinker AFB, OK. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Cordesman, A. (2003). The Iraq War: A Working Chronology. Washington: Center for 
Strategic and international studies.   
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The report generated by the 552 ACW detailed many shortfalls in training 
and preparation that were highlighted during the initial spin up prior to 
deployment for OIF.  The report also highlighted more experiences the crews had 
during combat operations that were recommended to be included as future 
training requirements.  The table below details these findings and their frequency 
within the lessons learned report. 
 
 Spin-up Execution Training Total 
TST/CAS 4 1 4 9 
AAR 1 2 1 4 
Crew Employment 1 2 5 8 
Table 8.   Instances of events mentioned in 552 ACW OIF Lessons Learned49 
 
Table 8 shows from the raw lessons learned data that after OIF, TST and 
CAS operations were still a high priority for ABMs, as well as aerial refueling 
operations.  ABMs experienced volumes of aircraft never seen by E-3 ABMs prior 
to OIF.  Comments in the report also identified that continued refinement and 
practice of these skills was need to maintain proficiency for what one entry stated 
“…prepared the crews to apply a new skill set that will most likely be needed in 
future conflicts”.50  Although these inputs were obtained from the “raw” lessons 
learned document that was compiled from inputs from all the E-3 units that 
participated in OIF, the final Lessons Learned presented to Headquarters Air 
Combat Command (ACC) echoed the same requirements for more emphasis 
and training in CAS and TST as well as more complex scenario training for 
refueling operations that would better prepare crews for the complexity and sheer 
numbers experienced in major theater warfare. 
The final 552 ACW lessons learned identified CAS and TST training as a 
shortfall and recommended the following actions: 
 
 




                                           
• Scenarios (live, DMO, and simulation) 
• Task training 
• Computer Based Training 
• Training should start in AFSC awarding school and continue 
through IQT, MQT, and CT51 
The recommendations for CAS added the following recommendation: 
• Training should be based on ‘doctrinal’ execution of CAS and apply 
some lessons learned from recent conflicts52 
Further lessons learned also identified that aerial refueling training was not 
adequate to prepare crews for refueling operations of the size or complexity 
experienced in OIF.  The following recommendations were made: 
• Close and tactical air refueling training needs to continue 
• Build complexity with number of receivers and tankers/tanker tracks 
• Provide training on managing several anchors (wx, loss of tankers, 
prioritization of information) 
• Tanker fuel management and MDS differences 
• Training should start in AFSC awarding school and continue 
through IQT, MQT, and CT53 
The report also identifies the fact that current mission crew simulation training 
does not adequately support complex battle management scenarios that would 
adequately train them for scenarios such as OIF.54  The recommendation 
identified that the current Boeing simulation teams in legacy ATD are unable to 
support full crew scenarios, and that these scenarios include few, if any dynamic 
inputs.  The lack of dynamic inputs in ATD scenarios presents a significant 
challenge to E-3 ABMs concerning the validity and completeness of training as 
discussed in chapter one with the definitions of proficiency and currency.  The 
report also recommended that AFI 11-2E-3 volume 1 be reviewed and include 
these training requirements: 
 






                                           
• Dynamic targeting 
• CAS 
• Data links 
• Interoperability 
• Air-to-air vs Air-to-surface  
• Integration of DMO 
The summary of the lessons learned report identified two essential items that 
current E-3 training does not adequately address.  The “common threads” as 
described in the report centered around training for complex battle management 
scenarios, with emphasis on 1) Decision making processes, and 2) Management 
of information.55  These are the two pillars of battle management; understanding 
what the information is when it is received, otherwise known as sensemaking, 
and knowing where the information needs to go.  These processes have two 
sides: 1) information management (IM) through technology, and 2) knowledge 
management (KM) that can be improved and developed through more effective 
training.  The next chapter discusses the new block 40/45 AWACS modification 
and the technological changes in IM that it will bring to the E-3 ABM.   
 
55 552 Operations Group. (2003). 552 Operations Group OIF Lessons Learned. Tinker AFB, 
Oklahoma. 
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IV. BLOCK 40/45: THE NEW INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
TECHNOLOGY 
The imperatives of this era demand that we modify our legacy 
systems, as well as the systems currently under development, and 
ensure that, when employed, we use them in ways that are suitable 
to the strategies we must support and the missions we must 
perform.—Dr. James Roche, Secretary of the Air Force56
A. AN OVERVIEW OF BLOCK 40/45 
The E-3 has continually proven over the years through many operations 
and conflicts that it is truly a “Go / No-go” asset for combatant commanders.57  
The 40/45 upgrade scheduled for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and delivery 
of five aircraft to the USAF in 2010 will usher in an unprecedented technological 
leap forward in battle management capability.  This leap forward not only 
enhances the capability of the ABMs on board, but also serves to solidify the E-
3’s place as a hub in the future command and control constellation.58   
The major advances in technology in 40/45 encompass 8 major areas.  
They are: (1) Multi-source integration of on and off board sensors; (2) battle 
management tools to include automatic Air Tasking Order and Airspace Control 
Order; (3) electronic support measure upgrades; 94) digital communications 
system upgrade; (5) improved data link infrastructure; (6) Single Integrated Air 
Picture (SIAP) fusion and tracking; (7) radar upgrades; and (8) mission recording 
and playback capability.59  Battle management upgrades will most directly affect 
operators on board the E-3. They will offer technological solutions to improve 
processes currently performed with the more laborious man-machine interface 
(MMI) presently on block 30/35 situation display console (SDC).  Block 40/45 is 
expected to reduce operator workload and improve situational awareness (SA) 
 
56 Quote by Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Roche in February, 2004 issue of Air Force 
Magazine. 
57 Waechter, B. (2004). Creating the Future AWACS Airborne Battle Management and 
Surveillance Capability. Powerpoint Briefing  
58 Talking Paper on Block 40/45. Mr. Don Gricol, 552 ACW/XPR. July 2004. 
59 Waechter, B. (2004). Creating the Future AWACS Airborne Battle Management and 
Surveillance Capability. Powerpoint Briefing 
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with the advent of more intuitive operator displays of information and flexible 
communications selectable at the operator’s console.60   
B. NEW APPLICATIONS AVAILABLE TO THE ABM 
This revolutionary change to the legacy computer system currently on the 
E-3 will offer many new applications that, in the 30/35 configuration, are done by 
hand or involve multi-step processes.  The new system will use commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) hardware and Windows/NT software, both of which are more 
familiar to operators than the legacy system currently employed on the E-3.  For 
example, feature select and category select switches, which are currently 
physical toggle switches, will be replaced with software driven displays that 
require less physical manipulation by the ABM and are more easily customized to 
an individual’s preferences for information display.61
Other battle management applications such as bearing and range 
between points, aircraft altitude, passive detection system displays and data link 
information will be available as “rollover” options.  The rollover option only 
requires the display cursor to be placed over the displayed track and information 
once available after 2-3 switch actions are now displayed instantaneously.  This 
allows the ABM to keep their field of view and attention on the developing air 
picture in front of them rather than focusing on the machine interface to get 
information.  The 40/45 system will have the ability to perform ATO parsing and 
ACO updates on the fly with no operator input.62  These are processes that are 
extremely operator intensive and cumbersome to accomplish in flight.  The 30/35 
AWACS requires that any updates are sent to the crews while airborne via High 
Frequency Messenger (HFM)—a system that uses HF radio waves and a 
standard email program such as Outlook to transmit data in the form of emails, 
word documents or excel documents for updates to ATO or ACO information.63  
 
60 Waechter, B. (2004). Creating the Future AWACS Airborne Battle Management and 
Surveillance Capability. Powerpoint Briefing 
61 Ibid. 
62 Talking Paper on Block 40/45. Mr. Don Gricol, 552 ACW/XPR. July 2004. 
63 552 Operations Group. (2003). 552 Operations Group OIF Lessons Learned. Tinker AFB, 
Oklahoma 
Block 40/45 will provide automatic ATO reception and parsing as well as 
automatic ACO reception and display to ensure that the most up-to-date 
information is available to ABMs making critical decisions in the airspace.64
Multi Source Integration (MSI) will combine all inputs from both on and off 
board the E-3 to include radar, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), electronic 
support measures, and data link information into a single, fused track on the 
display console.65  MSI will present the operator with higher fidelity track 
information to better facilitate continuous tracking and combat identification, 
significantly reducing operator workload required on 30/35 to maintain accurate 
reporting of track data.66  The physical console itself will also provide a better 
visual display for the ABM; the current plan calls for a 21 inch flat panel display 
with the option to expand to a 24 inch display when available.   
 
Figure 1.   What’s in block 40/4567 
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67Waechter, B. (2004). Creating the Future AWACS Airborne Battle Management and 
Surveillance Capability. PowerPoint Briefing  
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Although information management can be greatly aided and facilitated by 
technology, there is a slippery slope of what 40/45 itself will do to improve battle 
management on board the E-3.  There is a false and dangerous assumption that 
major advances in technology inevitably generate major advances in capability.  
This assumption is problematic; new technology certainly will help operator 
situational awareness and capabilities; however, technology alone will not be the 
catch all fix to improve SA among ABMs and E-3 performance overall.  The 
complete overhaul of capability for the E-3 will be in two parts.  First will be the 
immense leap forward in technology detailed in this chapter.  The second and 
more crucial portion is training.  If the E-3 community continues to train to current 
core competencies and skill sets, the full potential of the 40/45 system upgrade 
will not be realized.  To be completely effective, the major system overhaul 
scheduled for the E-3 needs to be completed by a major overhaul of the way 
ABMs use the system, and how they train to prepare for the full capability of the 
system, keeping pace with the rapidly advancing technology available from other 
weapons systems in the battlespace.  The answer will come in a complete 
retooling of the way we think about E-3 battle management training—that answer 
will come with the advent and embracing of knowledge management and 
sensemaking into how the E-3 community does business.   
V. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, SENSEMAKING AND 
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT: TRAINING FOR THE FUTURE 
A. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS—THE KEY TO EFFECTIVE 
EMPLOYMENT 
Situational Awareness (SA) is being aware of what is happening around 
you and understanding what the information means to you in the present, as well 
as what it will mean to you in the future.68  SA is an essential element of 
operational effectiveness to ABMs.  During operations, the concept of SA usually 
is applied to situations where individuals or groups of individuals are required to 
have a certain level of understanding of the environment and events as they are 
happening within that environment.  The formal definition of SA is: 
“The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume 
of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the 
projection of their status in the near future” 69
SA derives itself from the annals of military aviation history and the classic OODA 
(Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) Loop made famous by Colonel John Boyd in 
1976.70
                                      
Figure 2.   Boyd’s OODA Loop71                                             
68 Endsley, M., Bolte. B. &Jones, D. (2003). Designing for Situation Awareness: An approach 
to user-centered design. New York: Taylor and Francis. 
69 Endsley, M. (1988). Designing and evaluation for situation awareness enhancement. 
Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 32d Annual meeting (pp.97-101). Santa Monica: 
Human Factors Society 
70 Boyd, J. (1976). Destruction and Creation. This was the only written text on the subject, 
and he further developed his ideas in a series of Patterns of Conflict briefings from 1986 to 1992. 
71 Angerman, W. (2004). Coming Full Circle With Boyd’s Ooda Loop Ideas: An Analysis Of 




                                           
Individual elements that comprise SA for a particular event or operation 
differ greatly based on a situation; however, the fact that SA is crucial to decision 
making and performance is universal regardless of the endeavor.72  SA breaks 
down into three levels: 
• Level 1—perception of the elements in the environment 
• Level 2—comprehension of the current situation 
• Level 3—projection of future status  
1. Level 1 SA—Perception  
Level 1 SA is the first step to achieving SA where an individual perceives 
the status, attributes and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment.73  
For the ABM, this level of SA would translate into seeing and understanding 
alerts and alarms from the operator console, knowing the E-3s relative position in 
space to other aircraft, the status of communications and identification systems 
used for battle management, and the developing enemy situation.  Level 1 SA, or 
perception, can be visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory and taste, or possibly a 
combination of two or more of these senses.74  An ABMs confidence in 
information also contributes to the perception of information coming into the 
individual.  In military situations, it is difficult to assess all the required bits of 
information required to make effective decisions given the many factors involved.  
Obscured vision, aircraft noise, disorientation due to flight attitudes, confusion, 
and the dynamics of rapidly changing situations all contribute to distracting the 
ABMs attention and may lead to missing information critical to SA.75   
A study found that 76% of errors in the aviation realm occurred at Level 1, 
when pilots did not perceive necessary information to enhance their SA.76  This 
same study identified more key factors to Level 1 SA: 
 
72 Endsley, M., Bolte. B. &Jones, D. (2003). Designing for Situation Awareness: An approach 
to user-centered design. New York: Taylor and Francis. 
73 Ibid.   
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Jones, D. & Endsley, M. (1996). Sources of situation awareness errors in aviation. 
Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, 67(6), 507-512. 
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• In roughly two-fifths of cases, errors occurred due to missing 
information not provided due to operator or system limitations 
• In roughly one-fifth of the cases, errors occurred when the input 
was taken in but later forgotten, as new information was taken in 
and prioritized ahead of previous inputs 
• In approximately one-third of cases, all the information required 
was present, but not understood due to outside factors (distractions 
from something else)77 
All of these examples can happen to ABMs on board the E-3 in the current 30/35 
configuration and in the future 40/45 configuration.  No matter how good the 
technology of the system, information overload, rapidity of information onset, and 
multi-tasking requirements of the ABMs job can lead to missed information 
crucial to building SA.   
2. Level 2 SA—Comprehension  
Comprehension is the second step in achieving SA.  Level 2 SA is about 
understanding what the information means that is being taken in relation to the 
operator’s environment and situation.  This second step to SA involves 
integrating many pieces of data to construct information, and then prioritizing the 
importance of that information as it relates to achieving present goals.78  Level 2 
SA applied to the ABM includes: (1) seeing an air-to air-engagement develop 
visually on the situation display console, and (2) being able to understand 
communications calls from the pilots involved in that intercept so as to judge the 
call that needs to be made next to assist in the targeting of an enemy aircraft.  In 
this same situation, Level 1 SA would be simply hearing the words; in Level 2, 
the ABM would comprehend what is unfolding before them and is able to use the 
information to take some tactical action.   
Approximately 19% of aircraft errors occur at Level 2 SA.79  In cases of 
Level 2 errors, people are able to see or hear the necessary inputs; however, 
they are not able to correctly understand the meaning of that information.  An 
 
77Jones, D. & Endsley, M. (1996). Sources of situation awareness errors in aviation. Aviation, 
Space and Environmental Medicine, 67(6), 507-512.  
78 Endsley, M., Bolte. B. &Jones, D. (2003). Designing for Situation Awareness: An approach 
to user-centered design. New York: Taylor and Francis. 
79 Ibid. 
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example of this type of error would be an ABM recognizing that an aircraft under 
their control is at 10,000 feet altitude, but not realizing that this was 5,000 feet 
below the airspace minimum safe altitude.  An ABMs experience level will 
determine how adept they are at distinguishing between the two levels of SA.  An 
ABM with less experience or less training may lack the knowledge or experience 
base required to understand the inputs occurring to them, and will be at a 
disadvantage compared to an ABM with greater experience in developing Level 2 
SA. 
3. Level 3 SA—Projection of Future Status 
Level 3 SA is marked by the ability of an operator to know what elements 
of information are present, what they mean in relation to one another, and then to 
predict what those elements will do in the future.80  The use of Level 3 SA to 
accurately predict future action requires a solid understanding of the domain in 
which they are operating—a process that requires significant mental demands on 
the part of the operator or ABM.81  An example of Level 3 SA for the ABM is the 
ability to see and comprehend inputs in an air-to-air scenario and to determine 
what actions the pilots executing the intercept will most likely take based on 
understanding the current situation.  This experience allows the ABM to develop 
frames of reference in which to process the current information. 
Roadblocks to Level 3 SA can result from overloads of information—the 
inability to process all the information available—or due to insufficient knowledge 
of the domain—a lack of experience.82  Only six percent of aviation errors were 
found to occur at Level 3 SA, which most likely were caused by deficiencies at 
Levels 1 and 2, which contributed to an inability to achieve Level 3 SA.  A lack of 
experience and expertise, coupled with the lack of well designed information 
systems can lead many ABMs to fail in achieving the earlier stages of SA. If an 
operator fails to achieve the first two levels of SA, they are not afforded the 
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chance to achieve Level 3 SA.83  It is this level of SA that ABMs need to strive for 
in order to be effective when dealing with complex battle management situations.  
The advent of the 40/45 weapons system upgrade will help alleviate mistakes at 
level 1 with more intuitive displays and interfaces, however, action needs to be 
taken not only technologically at the lower levels of SA, but also through training 
to better prepare crews to process information at Levels two and three.  Although 
training can not instantly provide experience, the proper methodology and 
content of training can develop effective frames of reference in which operators 
can process information, ultimately achieving Level 3 SA.  The process of 
understanding information within frames of reference—or sensemaking—is 
crucial to an ABM’s ability to efficiently and effectively deal with dynamic 
situations encountered while performing battle management functions on board 
the E-3. 
4. Mental Models, Schema and Scripts 
a. Mental Models 
Long-term memory structures known as mental models play a 
critical role in the development and improvement of an individual’s SA in a given 
situation.  Mental models are complex structures individuals use to model the 
behavior of specific systems regardless of system purpose.84  Mental models 
also provide a systemic understanding of how a process works.  An example of a 
common mental model for an ABM may be understanding how to get information 
from the E-3’s computer.  Once the ABM receives the information, they also need 
to know where it needs to be passed to achieve a specific purpose, whether it is 
threat warning, information on an aircraft, or passing direction to a strike 
package.  Mental models may be formed for physical processes of interactions, 
such as computer system interfaces, as well organizational systems of passing 
and receiving information. 
ABMs form mental models of how their systems work; the E-3 
ms of aircraft under control, and the system of other  
83 Endsley, M., Bolte. B. &Jones, D. (2003). Designing for Situation Awareness: An approach 
to user-centered design. New York: Taylor and Francis 
84 Ibid. 
ABMs who comprise the weapons team on the E-3.  These mental models detail 
formal rules as well as the detailed expectations of their own behavior and the 
behaviors of others within these systems.85   
 
Figure 3.   Schema, mental models and situation awareness, adapted from Endsley, 
M., Bolte. B. &Jones, D. (2003). Designing for Situation Awareness: An 
approach to user-centered design. New York: Taylor and Francis 
 
Mental models are made up of two types of knowledge: semantic 
and system knowledge.86  Semantic knowledge usually is related to knowing the 
“what” side of information, whereas system knowledge answers the “how” 
aspect.  Semantic knowledge as it applies to the E-3 ABM includes the 
capabilities of the aircraft under their control or what a specific indicator on the 
situation display console means when illuminated.  System knowledge, which is 
the “how” portion of information, is crucial to developing mental models and 
begins by constructing how things work together for the observer to understand 
functions of systems.87
Mental models help an operator determine what information is 
important to address and in what sequence, and to enable the higher two levels 
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of SA (2&3) to develop without a big strain on working memory.88   In short, 
mental models allow ABMs to package information from internal and external 
sources based on experience and capability of the individual.  The absence of a 
mental model would make it impossible for an individual to understand what is 
happening around them, regardless of the amount or fidelity of the information 
being received.89   
b. Schemata 
Schemata are prototypical states of mental models that enable an 
individual to efficiently and effectively process information.90  An example of two 
schemata for an ABM would be: (1) how a certain aircraft would perform based 
upon type (fighter, bomber, tanker) and (2) how missions dealing with ground 
troops will look, sound and flow.  Schemata for ABMs allow them to quickly 
classify and understand information and to fit it together with other cues 
perceived by the operator.  What schemata really break down to is, “I’ve seen 
this before”; they really function as mental shortcuts where ABMs can see a 
situation they have been exposed to previously and rapidly place information into 
context where it needs to be.91  Schemata are built by experience; both live and 
training in the case of the ABM, as well as through the passing of experience 
from more experienced ABMs to those with less experience in the form of “war 
stories” and lessons learned.92
c. Scripts 
Scripts are associated with schema and dictate sequences of 
actions of what to do in each case that a schema represents.  ABMs have scripts 
of what actions to take in certain situations.  For example, when providing tactical 
threat warning, the actions of determining bearing and range from the friendly 
aircraft to the threat would be a script.  Scripts are developed over time with 
 
88 Endsley, M., Bolte. B. &Jones, D. (2003). Designing for Situation Awareness: An approach 






                                           
experience, and in the case of the ABM, may come from live experience or be 
developed over time in training.  Although scripts reduce the mental workload on 
an individual, the ABM still must understand the circumstances they are in 
completely enough to know which scripts to employ.93   
Models, Schema and scripts are all developed and reinforced over 
time with experience in particular situations.  Individuals with more experience 
require much less time processing and sorting out information to develop SA, 
whereas ABMs with less experience have a harder time, as they lack these 
cognitive frameworks.  The lack of frameworks to process information can lead to 
work overloads for less experienced individuals, which in turn result in gaps of 
SA.94  One way to aid ABMs in establishing these SA building tools is to design 
systems and train effectively to develop these mental models.  Individuals with 
well developed mental models have access to three main cognitive resources: 
• Dynamic direction of attention to critical environmental cues 
• Expectations of the future of the environment based on projection 
from Level 3 SA 
• An established a link between recognized cue classification and 
associated actions, allowing rapid decisions to be made in a give 
situation95 
These frameworks allow ABMs to effectively deal with the dynamic and complex 
environments presented in command and control and battle management 
scenarios.  A large portion of what the ABM does is making sense of the 
situations they are in, understanding that many of the scenarios they encounter 
are being experienced for the first time.  Although effective training can’t identify 
every possible event scenario, training to enhance the SA building process and 
employing the art of sensemaking to E-3 ABM training will better prepare ABMs 
for their mission tasking.   
 
B. SENSEMAKING—MAKING SENSE OF THE SITUATION 
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ABMs are being exposed to new methods and scenarios of warfare such 
as Effects Based Operations (EBO), where forces synchronize both lethal and 
non-lethal means of warfare to defeat their adversaries.  Fusing lethal and non-
lethal means of warfare as was evidenced in OEF and OIF, require ABMs to be 
able to make sense of their changing situations in the battlespace across multiple 
functional areas and technical disciplines.96  Network centric warfare, one of the 
major selling points of the 40/45 AWACS upgrade, represents a departure from 
traditional platform-centric warfare to a concept of operations emphasizing 
information superiority.97  Alberts, Garstka and Stein (1999) define network-
centric warfare as: 
An information superiority-enabled concept of operations that 
generates increased combat power by network sensors, decision 
makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased 
speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, 
increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.98
Sensemaking is a concept that builds on traditional concepts of SA at the 
individual, organizational and cultural level.  It has broad reaching applicability to 
E-3 ABMs as sensemaking helps an individual or group of individuals to have a 
“deep understanding” of a situation.99  Sensemaking address key cognitive 
issues such as: 
• Placement of items into frameworks 
• Comprehending 
• Constructing Meaning 
• Interacting in pursuit of mutual understanding 
• Patterning 
• Redressing surprise100 
 
96 Leedom, D. (2001). Final Report: Sensemaking Symposium. Command and Control 
Research Program: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. 
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Sensemaking can be summed up in the German Expression 
Fingerspitzengeguhl—“the ability to feel the situation in one’s fingertips”.101  This 
is what we need to strive for in E-3 ABM training to address the dynamic and 
complex environments in which they do their jobs, as well as the fact that it takes 
valuable time to gain experience to the point that ABMs can exceed Level 1 and 
2 SA and enter into the realm of sensemaking and Level 3 SA.   
Training can be used to close the gap of experience by exposing ABMs to 
scenarios and situations that allow them to develop scripts, schemata and mental 
models.  This development through proper training will help ABMs achieve higher 
levels of SA and sensemaking when faced with situations never seen before or 
more taxing and complex than usually experienced.  Enhanced sensemaking can 
provide the ABM with the ability to deal with: 
• Rapidly emerging threats 
• Unfamiliar situations 
• Dynamic situations 
• Evaluate new information appropriately into existing frameworks 
• Collaborative network-centric operations102 
All the elements of sensemaking listed were identified as shortfalls in one form or 
another in the lessons learned following OEF and OIF.  They were termed 
differently as identified in chapter three as “congested airspace”, “dynamic 
targeting situations”, and “volumes of aerial refueling never seen before”.  The 
problem we are left with now is how and when to implement training changes that 
will be broad reaching enough to address the shortfalls identified in recent 
combat operations, and in what venue the changes will take place.  There will be 
an associated risk with making these changes; however, if the E-3 as a weapons 
system is to keep pace in the rapidly changing, effects-based operations push of 
the current Air Force, changes will need to be addressed. 
 




                                           
VI. REVAMPING TRAINING—THE ART OF EXECUTION 
A. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER:  THE INTEGRATED TRAINING 
MODEL 
E-3 ABM training needs to reflect a steady progression from skills to core 
competencies to the ability to assimilate these lower order skills into effective 
scenario execution.  The ability to effectively manage scenario execution is 
represented by the term Mission Essential Competency (MEC).  Mission 
Essential Competencies, such as the ABM experiences on the E-3 during 
operations, whether that is combat, peacetime or military operations other than 
war (MOOTW), are the pinnacle of training for crew environments.  MECs will not 
only affect group training and crew combat employment, but also will have effects 
on how individual training is completed from IQT, where positional training is 
accomplished, to MQT where initial aspects of crew integration are introduced.  
MECs serve to answer the major problem that plagues E-3 training today: as 
mission complexity increases in training, available opportunities to accomplish 
this training diminish due to availability of assets, capability of current simulation 
equipment and DoD budgetary constraints.103  MECs essentially tie all underlying 
training—essential skill development and core competencies—together to ensure 
E-3 aircrews are best prepared for all situations they might encounter 
operationally.   
As training complexity increases from individual proficiency to crew 
employment proficiency, training also supports the building of scripts, schemata 
and mental frameworks to enhance the operator’s ability to build SA from level 1 
to level 3.  The ultimate goal of this training hierarchy is to produce individuals 
and crews who are Combat Mission Ready (CMR): prepared to deploy at a 
moment’s notice and handle any operational mission they are tasked to execute.  
The CMR designation of an individual and E-3 crew denotes that they have 
 
103 Colegrove, C. & Bennet, W. (2005). Mission Essential Competencies. PowerPoint 
presentation prepared for Headquarters Air Combat Command. Express permission granted for 
use of information contained within the briefing from Mr. Chuck Colegrove, HQ ACC/DOTO, (757) 
764-7785, 9 September 2005 via telephone.   
successfully completed all subordinate training and have passed a standardized 
aircrew positional evaluation stating that they are in fact capable of perform their 
assigned duties.  As discussed in chapter two, there are two levels of experience 
for crew members based on numbers of hours flown executing operational 
missions as well as capabilities reviews; however, the frequency of training 
events is not the major issue with designing the most effective training for E-3 
ABMs.  The key to training effectiveness lies in its ability to emulate situations 
and circumstances experienced by ABMs.  It is through the process of training as 
realistically as possible that ABMs will develop the essential individual skills and 
competencies to improve their chances of higher SA and better integrate for 
effective combat crew employment at the highest level of SA and competency.   
1. The Integrated Training Model 
 
 
Figure 4.   The Integrated Training Model 
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The top of the Integrated Training Model is Combat Mission Ready status 
where an ABM should be able to achieve level 3 SA relying upon the scripts, 
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ata and mental models developed over time through both live and training 
experiences.  ABMs will be presented in both simulated and live training with 
situations that they have never seen; however, with the proper training in place, 
coupled with the technological advances that the 40/45 weapons system 
promises, ABMs should be able to make sense of their situations, adapt 
appropriately, and make effective decisions.  The left side—training—of the 
model shows the continuum of training as it begins at Initial Qualifying Training 
(IQT) with positional proficiency and progresses upward with increasing 
complexity to Continuation Training (CT).  CT is designed to emulate as best as 
possible through DMO, ATD, Live flying exercises (such as RED FLAG) and 
training missions, the conditions that will be experienced by ABMs in the field.  
As detailed earlier, however, many of these venues do not train to the workload 
and complexity required to effectively develop mental models that will help 
prepare E-3 crews and ABMs to deal with situations they have never seen 
before.  The mental models developed will provide frameworks where even 
though the exact experience is new to the ABM, they will be able to interpret and 
place information where it needs to be.  In fact, as discussed concerning the 552 
ACW spin up for OEF and OIF, critical shortfalls that were identified and rapidly 
accounted for have not remained in the E-3 ABM training regiment to a level that 
will ensure that they are prepared to execute them when necessary.  The right 
side—the progression of SA—shows how each of the blocks of graduated 
capabilities coupled with the cognitive tools associated increase as they 
approach Combat Mission Ready status.   
2. AWACS Mission Essential Competencies:  The Heart of the 
Matter 
There are seven identified MECs for AWACS overall: 
2. Organize and manage forces and combat s
employment 
3. Detect entities in Area of Interest 
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44 
n Area of interest 
agement104 
The a e many of these 
tasks and skills 
AN 
r overhaul of any existing “way of doing things” is a daunting task.  
There  la not broken, don’t fix it” mindset to take 
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6. Direct and manage tactical action i
7. Employ the E-3 and crew to enhance battle man
dvent of the 40/45 weapons system will no doubt mak
easier for operators on the E-3 to accomplish.  The tasks 
associated with detecting, identifying, tracking and reporting entities will be more 
automated with MSI and improved displays of information discussed earlier with 
the 40/45 upgrade.  These functions exist in the lower levels of training and SA—
they are effectively the bottom half of the Integrated Training Model—and 
therefore will feel the biggest impact due to better technology and man-machine 
interface.  The other issues detailed in the MECs—organizing and managing 
forces, directing action and employing the E-3 weapons system—all exist at the 
top of the Integrated Training Model.  This is the realm that requires higher SA 
(Level 3 and sensemaking) to ensure that ABMs will be effective in future combat 
operations.  This realm also requires more intensive and complex training not yet 
widely available to all E-3 ABMs.  The question is:  How and when should a plan 
be executed to revamp E-3 training to most effectively utilize the technology 
leaps in 40/45 and enhance overall combat effectiveness of the E-3 weapons 
system? 
B. CHOOSING THE RIGHT TIME TO CHANGE AND EXECUTING THE 
PL
1. When is the Right Time? 
A majo
is a rge capacity for the “if it’s 
specially when success has been proven over the years, as it has in the 
USAFs E-3 impressive combat record.  The fact that E-3 training has to evolve is 
not up for debate if the USAF wants to keep E-3 ABMs viable and capable of 
completing the evolving AWACS mission into the future.  Returning into 
“reconstitution” for two years following OIF, the task of the 552 ACW and 18th 
Wing  at Kadena AB, Japan and 3d WG at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska was clear: (1) 
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train existing E-3 aircrews back to CMR status for requirements they weren’t able 
to accomplish while deployed, and (2) train to clear up the backlog of ABMs 
awaiting IQT and MQT at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma as a result of flying 
training slowing way down due to the heavy deployment load for OIF.   
As stated earlier, current E-3 DMO and ATD can not effectively emulate 
scenarios to adequately train crews to the level this paper is advocating
rios to reinforce lower supporting competencies and provide ABMs with the 
capability to get to higher levels of SA and sensemaking.  That only will happen 
with experience—which is hard to come by—or filling that existing experience 
gap with effective training.  The 552 ACW will have to determine the best course 
of action for training crews on the new 40/45 technology once delivered.  They 
have many options available as the aircraft will be delivered over a 5 year period 
with Initial Operational Capability slated for Fiscal Year 2010 and Full Operational 
Capability in 2015.105  Regardless of what route the 552 ACW and the USAF 
decide to take with transition training to block 40/45, a revamping of training to 
enhance the E-3s overall combat capability should compliment the advance in 
technology.  Without revamping training to provide E-3 ABMs with the capability 
to achieve higher levels of SA through building on skill sets and core 
competencies with more advanced and complex training scenarios in the form of 
training for Mission Essential Capabilities, the leaps of capability afforded by 
40/45 never will be realized.  No change in training to realize the full potential of 
the 40/45 weapons system would be like buying a Ferrari, only to drive it 35 miles 
per hour and never take it to the race track.   
Fiscal year 2010 will bring about great changes for the 552 ACW and Air 
Force with the arrival of the new E-3 system
ance and crew transition from 30/35 to 40/45 has not been drafted, one 
thing should be clear: the arrival of the new weapons system marks the most 
logical time to revamp ABM training.  However the 552 ACW, along with inputs 
from Headquarters Air Combat Command, Headquarters Air Force and Boeing, 
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decides to implement the transition, there will be some loss of combat capability 
during the transition.  Regardless of what implementation plan the Air Force 
chooses, a major weapons system overhaul will require positional familiarization 
training and time for the operators to be comfortable with the new system.  
Regardless of how much “better” or “easier” the new technology will make the 
ABMs job on the E-3, anything new requires training and time to learn how to use 
it effectively.   
2. Implementing the New Idea—the Art of Execution 
Executio
and whats, questioning, tenaciously following through, and en
accountability.  It includes making assumptions abou
environment, assessing the organization’s capabilities, linking 
strategy to operations and the people who are going to implement 
the strategy, synchronizing those people and their various 
disciplines…it also includes mechanisms for changing assumptions 
as the environment changes and upgrading the organization’s 
capabilities to meet the challenges of an ambitious strategy.  
Bossidy & Charan on Execution, The Discipline of Getting Things 
Done.106
The discipline of execution derives from the idea that, to get things d
anization, from the hi
underway.  There are three main points to execution: 
• Execution is a discipline, and integral to strategy 
• Execution is the major job of the organization’s lea
• Execution must be a core element of an organizat
r F rce and 552 ACW will be taking on a major challenge 
40 45 weapons system on board the E-3.  Due to the critical capab
that the E-3 provides for the Department of Defense and regional combatant 
commanders, the transition to 40/45 must occur with a minimal loss of combat 
capability in the overall E-3 force.  It is difficult for strategy implementation to be 
successful without taking into account an organization’s ability to execute the 
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Every organization has these three processes in one form or another, and the 
                                           
plan.108  The Air Force has nominally five years to develop a strategy of 
implementation for 40/45 accession.  Although there is no clear cut plan at this 
point, there are many factors that need to be considered.  Some of these points 
that will have an effect on combat capability of the 552 ACW are: 
• Which squadron will be the first to upgrade? 
• When will the Replacement Training Unit (9
training 30/35 to 40/45? 
How many crews will be 




How will a “split fle
combatant commanders? 
this is not an exhaustive li
evolution that an organization encounters will have broad reaching impacts on 
how that organization will function.  The idea is that once the new way of doing 
things is introduced, the organization will not be the same as it once was.  
Although this seems intuitive and obvious, a lack of strategy for change and the 
means to execute the plan are where many transitional organizations fall short of 
their goals.109
The hea
1. The people process 
2. The strategy process
3. The operations proces
552 ACW is no different.  Often, these processes are not well integrated within 
an organization and are treated separately rather than integrated into one unified 
strategy for change.  The people within the organization will look at the change 
 
108 Ibid. 
109Bossidy, L. & Charan, M. (2002). Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done. New 





                                           
and do what is required of them; however, old patterns of behavior and thought 
processes may remain in place even after the change has occurred.  This 
lingering clutch on the old organizational ideas is the major inhibitor to progress 
and change within an organization.  This stagnation of thought can inhibit the 
strategy process; it is often marked by putting working groups together that sit in 
conference rooms looking at PowerPoint presentations on what should happen 
and gain reassurance from the fact that the change processes have been 
identified.111  A solid plan of execution, where the ideas make it out of the 
computer into action, is necessary for the future capability of the organization to 
be realized.  The operations process is the ‘how’ of doing things in the future.  It 
is hard for a person to conceptualize how things will be after the change in an 
organization.  This is especially true if the organization as a whole does not 
embrace the change from top to bottom and execute it in a manner that forces 
the people, strategy and operations to work together and break down the 
fractionalized nature of these processes operating independent of one another.   
Another inhibitor to sweeping changes within an organization is the
ation of performance associated with a new idea or process for doing 
things.  Changes bring high expectations on the part of an organization’s 
leadership.  One primary expectation is that assumption of risk that comes with 
implementation of new processes will have immediate payoffs.  That is not 
always the case, however, as the positive impact of major organizational 
change—such as revamping the overall training philosophy for the E-3 ABM—
may not be realized instantaneously.  The desired effect may take months or 
years to be fully realized, but without this acceptance of risk to change, major 
moves forward in capability will scarcely be realized.  
 
111 Bossidy, L. & Charan, M. (2002). Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done. New 
York: Crown Business 
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Figure 5.   Expectations versus reality with the introduction of a new idea and its 
effects on combat capability.112 
 
Figure 13 shows how the introduction of a new idea into an organization 
will spark the individual’s expectations to lead them to believe that instantaneous 
improvements will be realized above the baseline capability.  The reality of the 
situation is better depicted in the new idea curve.  Any transformational idea or 
process once executed in an organization will have an effect on capabilities; in 
the case of the 552 ACW, this effect will be manifested in combat readiness.  The 
major point to take from this chart is that although there will be an initial dip in 
combat capability; the payoff is that the overall capability of the squadron in the 
long term will be greater than the initial baseline capability.  The mitigation of this 
risk has the potential to be the biggest roadblock to implementing a new idea on 
how to train E-3 ABMs.  No one individual wants to be the one to suggest a loss 
of capability based on a theory that things will get better if we do them differently.  
The decision to retool the training game for the E-3 to get increased complexity in 
training and to better realize the full potential of the new weapons system needs 
to be initiated and supported by the Air Force as whole.  The 552 ACW needs the 
support of the Air Force to effectively transition to 40/45 and implement the new 
 
112 Adapted from the US Navy Chief Information Officer briefing delivered 19 July 2005 to 
the US Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California. 
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training concepts detailed in this thesis.  If that support is not in place, the chance 
of a 100% effective transition to 40/45, with all the enhanced capabilities it 




Training for E-3 ABMs is not adequate to prepare them for all of the 
missions they may be tasked to perform in the battle space of the future.  Gaps in 
required experience were well documented following OEF and OIF, and the 
changes to training reflected in AFI 11-2E-3 volume 1 although an attempt to 
rectify the problem, do not provide the frequency and complexity of training 
required for ABMs to become proficient in complex battle management 
scenarios.  Developing training scenarios that will allow ABMs to develop the 
capacity to operate at the highest levels of situational awareness and 
sensemaking will bridge the gap of experience in the E-3 ABM career field.  The 
40/45 weapons system upgrade on the E-3 will help ABMs and other aircrew in 
performing duties in the lower realms of SA (levels one and two) but achieving 
level three requires mental models that are only developed through practical 
experience in conjunction with realistic simulation and training. 
As an end user of flying training, the E-3 must rely on many other 
weapons systems and organizations to fly to get adequate training in battle 
management scenarios.  Continuing budget constraints and difficulty in meshing 
training requirements between the E-3 and the aircraft they control for training 
will continue into the future.  The implementation of training in the form of Mission 
Essential Competencies will help ABMs to gain experience in complex battle 
management scenarios that will allow them to form the mental models required to 
make difficult decisions during live operations, often in situations they have never 
experienced previously.  The most effect method to accomplish this training is in 
the emerging Distributed Mission Trainers (DMT) at Tinker Air Force Base, 
Kadena Air Base and Elmendorf Air Force base.  Although the DMT lay down for 
other weapons systems required for training is not robust enough to support the 
complexity of training scenarios required today, that capability will continue to 
increase over time as more weapons systems receive their DMTs and are linked 
into the overall DMO architecture.   
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It is absolutely critical that the Air Force continue to fund and develop the 
connectivity required among all the DMT users to join the network and train 
together to simulate the complexity of operational missions experienced by E-3 
crews in OEF and OIF.  The 40/45 upgrade is half the equation concerning E-3 
sustainability.  There is a critical piece that needs to be addressed in training, or 
the Air Force will not evolve its command and control and battle management 
capabilities to keep pace with the vision of Dominant Battlespace Knowledge 
introduced in chapter two.  If the United States military is to not only keep pace 
with our adversaries, but to stay in front of them in technological and personnel 
capability, we can not miss this opportunity to revamp how the E-3 trains for 
combat proficiency. 
The time to accomplish this revolution in training is simultaneously with the 
40/45 upgrade beginning in fiscal year 2010.  The 552 ACW already will have 
accepted some loss in combat capability no matter what manner of upgrade to 
40/45 they choose.  By consolidating the retooling of training with the technology 
upgrade, ABMs and other E-3 crew members will be able to more effectively 
change their mental models of how to employ with the new weapons system 
rather than using old cognitive methods associated with the 30/35 weapons 
system.  The Air Force leadership and 552 ACW leadership will need to accept 
the fact that there will be some loss of combat capability to implement this plan; 
however, with proper execution, the ultimate payoff will provide combatant 
commanders with a much more capable command and control platform.   
To make this transition possible, the Air Force will need to continue 
funding and implementing the Distributed Mission Operations concept of 
operations.  Also, the Air Force will need to support training to accomplish the 
technology upgrade in 40/45.  Much of the ABMs transition training will be 
accomplished positionally in a simulated environment; however, to ensure that 
the weapons system can be employed to the best of its capability will only be 
tested in realistic training scenarios.  To accomplish this will require the support 
of other organizations whether in live flying or DMO operations.   
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The path is clear for the Air Force.  Ensuring the E-3 is a viable platform 
both technologically and capability-wise, changes need to happen.  The 40/45 
upgrade will answer the technological viability of the platform for the future.  The 
point to take away here is that we also need to change training, and 2010 is the 
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